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ABSTRACT
A fundamental maneuver in autonomous space operations is known as ren-
dezvous, where an active spacecraft navigates towards and maneuvers within
close proximity of a free-flying passive spacecraft. Any mistake during au-
tonomous space flight can be extremely costly, yet these systems are difficult
to verify due to limitations of testing spacecraft. In this thesis, we present
a benchmark model formulation for the rendezvous mission, two control so-
lutions to achieve this mission, and a rigorous method to demonstrate that
the resulting system’s behavior remains safe.
The benchmark model provides both a nonlinear description of the space-
craft’s motion and a linearized approximation, and the mission objectives, or
equivalently, our set of safety properties. We present a set of control solutions,
which includes a hybrid, or switched, version of linear quadratic regulator
(LQR)—a fundamental approach in the theory of optimal control for linear
systems. We formulate a novel hybrid controller, dubbed state-dependent
linear quadratic (SDLQ) control, which extends the former controller in a
way that may improve its ability to generate only safe trajectories. With
these choices of dynamical models and controllers, we obtain a collection of
models that are shown to robustly achieve safety properties of interest using
a suite of hybrid verification tools. We utilize several existing tools, each de-
veloped for different classes of hybrid models, and we implement a new tool
called SDVTool which improves upon one of the former tools. We present
experimental results that illustrate the promise (and ongoing challenges) of
this approach; that is, applying a class of simulation-based verification al-
gorithms to our proposed set of benchmark models and safety requirements
to design and rigorously demonstrate safety of the autonomous satellite ma-
neuver. We will demonstrate both successful, safe scenarios and incomplete
or unsafe examples.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The National Research Council published a report on NASA’s roadmaps for
2011-2021 and listed relative guidance algorithms (or the autonomous con-
trol of spacecraft to perform fundamental maneuvers on-orbit) as one of the
highest-priority technologies for enabling next-generation space missions [1].
The model of an autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking
(ARPOD) mission presented in [2] captures the essence of relative guidance
problems in a generic, reusable scenario. This scenario and its components
are essential in applications such as on-orbit transportation of personnel [3],
resupply for personnel [4], assembly of space stations [5], and repair and
refueling of spacecraft [6].
In particular, rendezvous refers to navigating a primary spacecraft towards
a secondary free-flying object (which we fix to be a satellite) and maneuver-
ing within close proximity of the target without collision. This presents a
challenging constrained guidance problem. An overview of general state-
of-the-art solutions to this particular problem is given in [7]. While such
approaches have led to some successes, recent examples suggest they are
not fully mature technologies nor guaranteed to behave safely. For example,
NASA’s DART spacecraft was designed to rendezvous with the MUBLCOM
satellite [8]. In 2005, approximately 11 hours into a 24-hour mission, DART’s
propellant supply depleted due to excessive use of thrusters, and it began a
mission abort sequence. In the process it collided with MUBLCOM; it met
only 11 of 27 mission objectives, rendering the loss of a $110 million project.
Several other incidents in [9] highlight the consequences of failures in space
applications and demonstrate the need for more rigorous testing before de-
ployment.
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Formal verification is a means of providing proofs of safe behavior given
the model of a system. Hybrid models, which capture systems with both
discrete and continuous variables and dynamics, provide an expressive frame-
work for describing complex cyber-physical systems. Verification of hybrid
systems presents a big challenge, but recent advances in this area motivate
and enable its application to the problem of autonomous spacecraft navi-
gation. Although formal verification has played an important role in design
and safety analysis of spacecraft hardware and software (see, for example, [10]
and the references therein), it has not yet been used for model-based design
and system-level verification and validation.
1.2 Thesis Overview
We present a suite of hybrid models for the rendezvous portion of the ARPOD
mission [2] that can serve as benchmarks for verification tools and as building-
blocks for more complex missions. These models include two controllers
we design to achieve rendezvous, as well as mission objectives (or safety
properties) such as physical limitations of the spacecraft, its interaction with
the target, and the concept of passive safety—the ability to maintain both
propulsion-free and collision-free motion in the event of a system failure. We
verify these benchmark problems with a series of hybrid verification tools,
including well-established (C2E2 and SpaceEx) and recently released (DryVR)
tools and one introduced from analyzing the ARPOD model (SDVTool).
These rendezvous mission problems can be configured to any combination
of the following choices:
• nonlinear (NLin) orbital dynamics, or linearized (Lin) dynamics using
the Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) equations [11];
• switched LQR (SwLQ) with state-dependent switching signal, or state-
dependent linear quadratic (SDLQ) control with time-dependent switch-
ing signal;
• passive abort (Pass) or without. The passive abort scheme adds a mode
to the hybrid control strategy, in which the spacecraft will shut off its
thrusters when it detects any system failure, thus motivating the need
to check for passive safety.
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The set of constraints for the rendezvous mission lends itself naturally
to two partitions of the state-space, each with a different subset of active
constraints. As a consequence, the first controller is chosen to be a switched,
two-mode control scheme with statically computed linear quadratic regulator
(LQR) in each mode. We refer to this as the switched LQR (SwLQ) scheme.
Unlike traditional optimal control solutions, we propose a cost function
with dynamic, state-dependent coefficients. The state-dependent LQ (SDLQ)
scheme extends switched LQR so that the quadratic cost function is period-
ically re-evaluated for new coefficients and solved.
We test the benchmarks with state-of-the-art hybrid verification tools:
C2E2 [12, 13] and SpaceEx [14]. C2E2 can handle nonlinear models, and
both tools are capable of handling linear models containing continuous dy-
namics described by ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The SDLQ con-
figuration does not admit a closed-form control solution, so we additionally
utilize a data-driven tool called DryVR [15]—capable of analyzing black-box
models—to verify SDLQ models.
C2E2 proved to be the more versatile tool in our experiments, yet it did
not perform well particularly for models that include the passive abort mode
(Pass). To address this issue, we apply a different algorithm for comput-
ing reachable states of the system—a necessary component behind each of
these verification tools—and implement this in a new software tool we call
SDVTool.
We successfully show that several of the models do behave safely within the
rendezvous mission constraints, under a set of mission parameters (i.e. time
horizon and initial conditions) that we define. Overall, we believe that our
results and approaches establish the feasibility of system-level verification of
autonomous space operations, and they provide a foundation for the analysis
of more sophisticated maneuvers in the future.
1.3 Related Work
There are few academic works on system-level verification of autonomous
spacecraft. A survey of general verification approaches and how they may
apply to small satellite systems is presented in [16]. Architecture and Anal-
ysis Design Language (AADL) and verification and validation (V&V) over
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AADL models for satellite systems have been reported in [17].
A feasibility study for applying formal verification of autonomous satellite
maneuvers is presented in [18]. That approach relied on creating rectangu-
lar abstractions (dynamics of the form x˙ ∈ [a, b]) of the satellites dynamics
through hybridization and verification using PHAVer [19] and SpaceEx [14].
The generated abstract models have simple dynamics but hundreds of lo-
cations, and also the analysis is necessarily conservative. In contrast, the
approaches presented in this thesis work directly with the linear (nonlinear)
hybrid dynamics.
The ARPOD challenge [2] has been taken up by several researchers in
proposing a variety of control strategies. A two-stage optimal control strat-
egy is developed in [20], where the first part involves trajectory planning
under a differentially flat system and the second part implements model
predictive control on a linearized model. A supervisor is introduced to ro-
bustly coordinate a family of hybrid controllers in [21]. Safe reachsets (i.e.
ReachAvoid sets) are computed for the ARPOD mission in [22] and used to
solve for minimum fuel and minimum time trajectories.
The results presented in this thesis are directly related to previous works:
the tool SDVTool and SwLQ control solution are first presented in [23], the
SDLQ controller in [24], and a related tool for model predictive control in [25].
1.4 Organization
In Chapter 2, we present the detailed formulation of the various benchmark
autonomous rendezvous missions. An overview of the formal verification
approach used is given in Chapter 3, and its detailed implementation in
SDVTool is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses how the benchmark
models are specified for the software tools and summarizes the resulting safety
guarantees achieved.
4
CHAPTER 2
SPACECRAFT RENDEZVOUS MODEL
In this chapter, we present the detailed hybrid satellite rendezvous mission
models. First we give the orbital dynamics of the spacecraft in Sections 2.1-
2.2. Section 2.3 introduces the mission constraints, and we propose two
controllers designed to achieve the constrained rendezvous mission in Sec-
tions 2.4-2.5. We give an overview of the hybrid automata modeling frame-
work and how our benchmarks are represented as hybrid models in Sec-
tion 2.6.
2.1 Nonlinear Relative Motion Dynamics
The dynamics of the two spacecraft in orbit—the target and the chaser—are
derived from Kepler’s laws. We consider the case for relative motion in space,
where the two spacecraft are restricted to the same orbital plane, resulting
in two-dimensional, planar motion. The so-called Hill’s relative coordinate
frame is used. As shown in Figure 2.1, Hill’s frame is centered on the target
spacecraft, with +iˆ-direction pointing radially outward from the Earth, +kˆ-
direction normal from the orbital plane, and +jˆ-direction completing a right-
handed system. We further assume that the target moves on a circular orbit,
and thus, the jˆ-direction aligns with the tangential velocity of the target.
The restriction on the target’s orbit implies that the target-centered frame
rotates with constant angular velocity. We will assume the target is in geo-
stationary equatorial orbit (GEO), with angular velocity n =
√
µ
r3
, where
µ = 3.986 × 1014 m3/s2 and r = 42164 km. The chaser’s position is repre-
sented by the vector ~ρ = xˆi+yjˆ, and the acceleration provided by the chaser’s
thrusters is denoted ~u = Fxi + Fyj. Note we will also frequently refer to the
separation distance with the notation: ρ := |~ρ| = √x2 + y2. The following
equations are derived using Kepler’s laws and constitute the nonlinear model
5
Earth
Target
Chaserjˆ
iˆ
~ρ
rc
Figure 2.1: Hill’s relative coordinate frame. Chaser’s relative position
vector is ~ρ = xˆi + yjˆ. (Direction +kˆ out of the page not shown.)
(NLin) of the spacecraft dynamics:
x¨ = n2x+ 2ny˙ +
µ
r2
− µ
r3c
(r + x) +
Fx
mc
,
y¨ = n2y − 2nx˙− µ
r3c
y +
Fy
mc
,
(2.1)
where rc =
√
(r + x)2 + y2 and mc = 500 kg is the mass of the chaser. The
constant parameters of this set of equations are given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of constant parameters used to describe the
continuous system dynamics in Equations (2.1)-(2.2).
Variable Value
µ 3.986× 1014 m3/s2
r 42164 km
n 7.29× 10−5 s−1
mc 500 kg
The three-dimensional case is also given in [2], where the satellites’ relative
altitude z is considered. In this case, the chaser’s relative position is ~ρ =
xˆi+yjˆ+zkˆ, external force or input vector ~u = Fxi+Fyj+Fzk, and dynamics
z¨ = −n2z + Fz
mc
. Notice this additional dimension evolves linearly and is
decoupled from the two-dimensional system, so synthesizing a controller for
the three-dimensional problem is a straightforward, independent extension
of solving the two-dimensional control problem. We do not address this
extension in this thesis.
The control and navigation problem for rendezvous is to choose Fx, Fy to
drive the system towards ~x = 0, while adhering to the constraints that are
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given in Section 2.3. Our solutions given in Sections 2.4-2.5 draw from theory
for linear systems, hence we give a linear approximation in the next section.
We will also observe the system under a passive abort, where rendezvous is
no longer an objective and Fx = Fy = 0. In this case, the control portion is
trivial but safety verification remains a crucial part of our analysis. An abort
sequence is triggered when some system failure is detected. In order to keep
this condition as general as possible, we assume that the event that triggers a
passive abort occurs within some user-specified time interval. However, this
could be customized to be a function of the state or some other parameter
other than time if desired. We note that it is not expected for the system to
satisfy a passive safety property (i.e. collision avoidance in Section 2.3) for
an arbitrary choice of this interval.
2.2 Linear Dynamics
Linearization of Equations (2.1) about the system’s equilibrium point at the
origin results in the Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) equations [11], which
are commonly used to capture the relative motion dynamics of two satellites
within a reasonably close range. These equations for the linear model (Lin)
are:
x¨ = 3n2x+ 2ny˙ +
Fx
mc
,
y¨ = −2nx˙+ Fy
mc
.
(2.2)
Let the state vector be denoted by ~x = [x, y, x˙, y˙]T . The state-space form
of these linear time-invariant (LTI) equations is:
~˙x = A~x+B~u,
where
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
3n2 0 0 2n
0 0 −2n 0
 , B =

0 0
0 0
1
mc
0
0 1
mc
 , ~u =
[
Fx
Fy
]
.
7
2.3 Constraints and Safety Requirements
In this section, we enumerate the properties that define a safe and successful
mission as given by [2], and how they are modeled for verification tools.
The tools we use (C2E2, DryVR, and SpaceEx) require these sets of states
be specified by affine inequalities (and more specifically, convex polyhedron).
Bear in mind that the goal of rendezvous is to drive the system to state
~x = 0, but the goal of passive abort is to avoid the region around ~x = 0.
These distinct objectives naturally result in mutually exclusive constraints.
Max thrust The thrusters are physically limited, so we assume that at any
given time, the thrusters cannot provide more than 10N of force in any
single direction. Then the constraint
|Fx|, |Fy| ≤ 10 N
is captured by the following unsafe sets of states:
Fx < −10, −Fx < −10,
Fy < −10, −Fy < −10.
Notice that F{x,y} is not strictly part of the state space (~x), but soon
we shall choose F{x,y} directly as a function of the state ~x. But we
could also introduce an augmented state vector ~˜x =
[
~x
~u
]
. This latter
approach is implemented as discussed in Section 5.1.
LOS cone and approaching velocity When the chaser is in close-range
rendezvous (ρ =
√
x2 + y2 < 100 m), the chaser must remain within
a line-of-sight (LOS) cone (see Figure 2.5), and its total velocity must
remain under 5 cm/s, so
√
x˙2 + y˙2 ≤ 5 cm/s. Notice this unsafe set,
{~x :
√
x2 + y2 < 100 ∩
√
x˙2 + y˙2 > 0.05},
cannot be captured by affine inequalities exactly. Thus it is approxi-
mated by the intersection of two polytopes using a hexagon in x, y that
circumscribes the circle
√
x2 + y2 = 100 and a hexagon in x˙, y˙ that
inscribes the circle
√
x˙2 + y˙2 = 0.05 (see Figure 2.2). The unsafe set
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is completely contained in the approximated unsafe set. The detailed
approximation is given in Table 5.1.
Minimum separation distance During a passive abort, the chaser must
avoid collision with the target. The target, in the simplest case, can be
treated as a point mass at the origin, where a small ball or box should
be used to bound this point to account for limitations in numerical
precision. We may also account for the target satellite’s dimensions,
which may range from the order of 1 m to 100 m, so the size of this
bounding box will vary depending on the scenario. For our experiments,
we use a box with a 1 m circumradius (see Figure 2.3 and Table 5.1).
x
y
100m
(a)
x˙
y˙
5cm/s
(b)
Figure 2.2: The dashed lines show the polytopic approximation of the
unsafe set of states resulting from the LOS constraint in projections on x, y
in (a) and on x˙, y˙ in (b).
2.4 Switched Linear Quadratic Regulator
In this section, we construct the first of two controllers proposed to achieve
rendezvous. This is a full-state feedback controller, namely, a linear quadratic
regulator (LQR). LQR is a linear function of the state, of the form ~u = Ki~x,
where i is introduced because we will design a set of LQR solutions. One
of the constraints given in [2] is a maximum time bound on completing the
ARPOD mission. We do not explicitly check for this property because we
are only interested in a subset of the full mission at this time. However, it
9
xy
1m
Figure 2.3: The unsafe set (shown in x, y-projection) resulting from
collision avoidance constraint when the spacecraft is in a Passive Abort and
not performing Rendezvous.
is clear that we cannot find a reasonable solution using a single LQR control
law as this solution would need to meet the constraint on total velocity, even
beyond the close-range rendezvous portion. In turn, completing the initial
rendezvous at larger separation distances would take an unreasonably long
time. We choose to solve for two LQR control laws: one for rendezvous at
longer ranges and another for the more restrictive close-range. A third trivial
control law in this set is that for the passive abort: Kpassive = 0. We will
refer to the resulting closed-loop system using each control law as a mode,
and the reason will become apparent in Section 2.6.
In general, closed-loop feedback control is desirable because the system
can measure and adjust for errors, and ultimately guarantee liveness (i.e.
eventually the target will be reached). LQR is specifically chosen because
it is constructed by minimizing a quadratic cost function, which we can
choose so as to roughly satisfy our safety constraints. LQR is only directly
applicable to (or guaranteed to be optimal for) linear systems, so we design
the control for the linearized model in (2.2), but we will use the same control
with nonlinear dynamics (2.1) when applying verification tools.
Each constant gain matrix Ki ∈ R2×4, i ∈ {1, 2}, is obtained by solving
two independent infinite-horizon LQR problems, as follows:
min
~u
J˜i,
subject to
~˙x = A~x+B~u,
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where
J˜i =
∫ ∞
0
(~xTQi~x+ ~u
TRi~u)dt, (2.3)
where Q{1,2} and R{1,2} are chosen so as to improve performance (i.e. mini-
mize flight time) when constraints are relaxed (i.e. when ρ ≥ 100 m) and to
restrict the system’s behavior to fit tighter constraints otherwise (i.e. when
the LOS cone and approaching velocity properties are enabled).
To achieve this, we apply a common approach to encoding restrictions on
state and input variables into Qi and Ri called Bryson’s rule [26]. Bryson’s
rule dictates choosing Qi and Ri to be matrices with diagonals such that
qjj =
1
max(x2j )
, j ∈ {1, ..., 4} and rjj = 1max(u2j ) , j ∈ {1, 2}. Typically these
terms correspond to the expected range of values for each variable, which then
normalizes the cost of errors in each direction. We take these terms to refer to
the largest desired value of each variable, given by the constraints. While the
LQR gains are obtained with our constraints in mind, the resulting controller
does not guarantee these constraints are never violated. This is why formal
verification is still required. This design process is repeated for rendezvous at
long and short ranges, corresponding with relaxed and tightened constraints
respectively.
The solution to the optimization problem of Equation (2.3) is obtained
by solving the continuous algebraic Riccati equation (ARE). Part of the
motivation for relying on a LQR-like framework is that ARE solvers are
well-studied and readily available. Given the controllability of the relative
motion model (2.2) and a restriction of Qi and Ri to symmetric, positive
definite matrices, there exists a guaranteed unique optimal control solution
~u = −Ki~x = −R−1i BTPi, where Pi is a positive definite solution to the
ARE. The solution is not only optimal with respect to (2.3) but ensures the
closed-loop system is globally asymptotically stable (GAS) about the origin
in each mode. This does not guarantee that the overall system is GAS under
switching.
Given this switched LQR controller (SwLQ), the resulting nonlinear model
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of the dynamics (or the flow equations for NLin-SwLQ) are:
x¨ =
(
3n2 − k
i
11
mc
)
x− k
i
12
mc
y − k
i
13
mc
x˙+
(
2n− k
i
14
mc
)
y˙,
y¨ = −k
i
21
mc
x− k
i
22
mc
y −
(
2n+
ki23
mc
)
x˙− k
i
24
mc
y˙,
(2.4)
where
Ki =
[
ki11 k
i
12 k
i
13 k
i
14
ki21 k
i
22 k
i
23 k
i
24
]
.
The flow equations for the Lin-SwLQ configuration can be written more
compactly as:
~˙x = (A−BKi)~x (2.5)
We note that a conventional switched LQR controller would require the
solution of the following finite horizon problem (instead of the J˜i given in
Equation (2.3)):
min
~u
N∑
i=1
∫ ti+1
ti
(~xTQi~x+ ~u
TRi~u)dt, (2.6)
where ti denotes switching times with N -total switches (N = 2 for SwLQ).
Thus, an optimal LQR solution would drive the state of the system to the ori-
gin by the specified time horizon TN+1, while minimizing (2.6). The infinite-
horizon formulation in (2.3) is easier to solve, but it loses the guarantee that
the state reaches the origin in finite time. This is acceptable for the ren-
dezvous maneuver as the goal is to drive the spacecraft within closer range,
not to a terminal point. The infinite-horizon LQR result will still drive the
spacecraft towards the origin, which can be observed by formulating invari-
ant sets of states using Lyapunov functions. (It is sufficient to solve for a
quadratic Lyapunov function using the Lyapunov equation for linear systems
and then apply Lyapunov’s first method to prove stability of the nonlinear
system.) At each switching time ti, the invariant set of states at ti is strictly
contained in the invariant set at ti−1. It follows that this switched controller
with i = {1, 2} (and the SDLQ in Section 2.5) is stable in the sense of
12
Lyapunov.
2.5 State-Dependent Linear Quadratic Control
We extend the two-stage, switched LQR from the previous section to N > 2
finitely many switches where the switches are brought about by a time-
dependent switching signal. Additionally, the system dynamics (i.e. equa-
tions (2.4)-(2.5)) are not computed a priori but determined by a function of
the current state; thus, we refer to the new control scheme as state-dependent
linear quadratic (SDLQ) control.
At every switching time (i.e. after every δ interval), the state-feedback law
is computed just as before, solving the LQR problem in Equation (2.3). In
the switched LQ scheme, Q{1,2}, R{1,2} are constant matrices, and K1, K2
are solved oﬄine. Now, the cost coefficients are functions denoted Qi(~x(ti))
and Ri(~x(ti)) and each Ki is computed at time ti.
In the example for this thesis, we choose a constant Ri = Rj = R ∈
R2×2, ∀i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}, and Qi(~x(ti)) defined as follows:
Qi(~x(ti)) = diag
(
1
q2x
,
1
q2y
,
1
q2x˙
,
1
q2y˙
)
,
where qx = 5 (|x(ti)|+ )
(
1 +
(|x(ti)|+ )2
ρ2
)
,
qy = 5 (|y(ti)|+ )
(
1 +
(|y(ti)|+ )2
ρ2
)
,
qx˙ =
40 (|x(ti)|+ )
ρ
,
qy˙ =
40 (|y(ti)|+ )
ρ
,
(2.7)
for some small  > 0 to avoid division by zero.
Notice Qi remains symmetric positive definite for all ~x ∈ R4 and R is
also chosen to be symmetric positive definite. Then, as in the switched LQ
control, we are guaranteed to find a stabilizing solution ~u[ti,ti+1) = −Ki~x.
The current choice of (2.7) is motivated by satisfying the LOS constraint
(see Section 2.3), hence it is a function only of x, y and not of relative
velocities x˙, y˙. Bryson’s rule can be observed as a starting design choice in
qx, qy in the (|x(ti)| + ), (|y(ti)| + ) terms. In other words, the maximum
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desired values for x, y contract as the chaser moves towards the origin. The
terms (|{x, y}(ti)| + )/ρ approximate | cos(θ)| and | sin(θ)|, where θ is the
angular position of the total displacement vector ~ρ. These terms could be
used to enforce the θ restriction in the LOS region more directly.
Although the computation of the controller is different from SwLQ (i.e.
now requires periodic re-computation of Equation (2.3)), the description of
the dynamics for NLin-SDLQ and Lin-SDLQ looks identical to that given
previously in Equations (2.4)-(2.5) for NLin-SwLQ and Lin-SwLQ, just with i
extended to i = 1, 2, ..., N .
2.6 Hybrid Models
In this section, we introduce the notion of a hybrid automaton model and
unify all the parts discussed thus far under this modeling framework.
A hybrid automaton is a tuple 〈V ,ΘH,A, D, T 〉, where:
(a) V = X ∪L is the set of state variables, with the state space taken to be
the valuation val(V). X is the set of continuous variables (val(X) = R4
for our problem), and L is a discrete variable with countable set val(L)
referred to as locations or modes.
(b) ΘH ⊆ val(V) is the set of initial states.
(c) A is a set of transition labels.
(d) D ⊆ val(V)×A×val(V) is the set of transitions—each characterized by
a guard and reset map. These give conditions under which a transition
is enabled and jump dynamics, respectively.
(e) T is a set of trajectories (continuous dynamics) for X or flow equations,
which are described by ODEs in our problem. For each l ∈ val(L),
there is a unique set of trajectories El and an invariant Il ⊆ val(X),
which indicates when the system may evolve according to El. If x ∈
val(X) and x 6∈ Ik, then the system must be in some other mode
l ∈ val(L) 6= k.
In general, trajectories do not have to be described by ODEs but must
satisfy certain properties given in [27]. A transition may be taken as long as
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its guard is satisfied. When the mode invariant aligns with a guard so that
the transition must be taken as soon as it is enabled, this is called an urgent
transition. Such transitions may preserve determinism. However, it is possi-
ble for multiple transitions to be enabled at a given time, so nondeterminism
can still arise from not knowing which transition is taken.
For the benchmark spacecraft problem, we have X = {x, y, x˙, y˙}, and
given Ki, all trajectories in Ei ∈ T are described by Equations (2.4) for
NLin and Equations (2.5) for Lin dynamics. The SwLQ controller lends
val(L) = {Mode1,Mode2}, with respective invariants: I1 = {~x : ρ ≥ 100}
and I2 = {~x : ρ ≤ 100}. For either the passive abort scenario Pass or
the SDLQ controller, we introduce an additional continuous variable so that
X = {x, y, x˙, y˙, τ}, where τ is a timer variable with τ˙ = 1. The Pass
scenario introduces an additional mode Passive ∈ val(L), with invariant
IPass = {(~x, τ) : τ ≥ t1}, and incoming transitions with guard t1 ≤ τ ≤ t2.
As previously mentioned, we choose to consider a passive abort nondeter-
ministically within a time interval [t1, t2].
Hybrid models for the Lin-SwLQ, Lin-SwLQ-Pass and Lin-SDLQ configura-
tions are shown in Figures 2.4-2.7. These examples should sufficiently illus-
trate how each of the 8 possible configurations can be formulated as hybrid
models. To summarize Chapter 2, we have presented a set of 8 benchmark
formulations of an autonomous satellite rendezvous mission that result from
choosing NLin or Lin dynamics, SwLQ or SDLQ control, and with or without
Pass. The systematic analysis of such hybrid models is presented next in
Chapter 3.
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Mode1:
~˙x = (A−BK1)~x
Inv:
ρ ≥ 100
Mode2:
~˙x = (A−BK2)~x
Inv:
ρ ≤ 100
~x0
[ρ ≤ 100]{}
[ρ ≥ 100]{}
Figure 2.4: Hybrid model for spacecraft rendezvous, using the Lin-SwLQ
configuration. The invariants in Mode 1 and Mode 2 are defined exclusively
by the chaser’s position, as shown by corresponding colors in Figure 2.5.
Recall a hybrid automaton is the tuple 〈V ,ΘH,A, D, T 〉. Here, ΘH is
depicted with the arrow labeled by ~x0 ∈ val(X), pointing to initial mode
Mode1 ∈ val(L). The two members of A are not explicitly given here, but
these transitions in D are labeled by guards in “[]” and resets in “{}”.
Notice these transitions are urgent. The trajectories T are specified by the
ODEs and invariants for each mode.
x
y
100m
~ρ
60◦
Figure 2.5: The invariants for Mode 1 and Mode 2 in Figures 2.4-2.6 are
shown in corresponding colors (blue and green). However, they are
approximated using the polytope shown by the dashed lines in the model
inputted to the verification software tools. The LOS region (gridded)
indicates the safe region of operation whenever the chaser is in Mode 2.
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Mode1:
~˙x = (A−BK1)~x
τ˙ = 1
Inv:
ρ ≥ 100∩τ ≤ t2
Mode2:
~˙x = (A−BK2)~x
τ˙ = 1
Inv:
ρ ≤ 100∩τ ≤ t2
Passive:
~˙x = A~x
τ˙ = 1
Inv:
τ ≥ t1
~x0,τ :=0
[ρ ≤ 100]{}
[ρ ≥ 100]{}
[τ ∈ [t1, t2]]{}
[τ ∈ [t1, t2]]{}
Figure 2.6: Hybrid model for spacecraft rendezvous with passive abort,
using the Lin-SwLQ-Pass configuration. Transitions to Passive occur
nondeterministically within an interval of time.
Mode:
~˙x = (A−BK)~x
τ˙ = 1
Inv:
R5
~x0,τ :=0
[τ==δ]
{τ :=0, K:=update(~x)}
Figure 2.7: Hybrid model for spacecraft rendezvous using the Lin-SDLQ
configuration. The subroutine update(~x) computes the SDLQ solution.
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CHAPTER 3
VERIFICATION APPROACH
In this chapter, we present the underlying verification algorithm in the soft-
ware tools we use. We introduce the notion of reachability analysis—the
building block to our verification approach—and give an overview of how
each tool differs in this regard.
3.1 Safety Verification Problem
To rigorously demonstrate that a hybrid system (H = 〈V ,ΘH,A, D, T 〉) can
never exhibit unsafe behaviors, we study the reachability problem: Given a
set of initial states ΘH ⊂ val(V) and a set of unsafe states U ⊂ val(V), does
there exist a trajectory from some v ∈ ΘH to some v ∈ U? If so, then we
conclude the system is unsafe. However, in general, the reachability problem
is undecidable [28, 29, 30], so existing approaches typically provide a means
of overapproximating reachsets R ⊂ val(V)—sets of reachable states of the
system—over a bounded time horizon T ∈ R≥0.
3.1.1 Related Works
Several recent works propose simulation-based approaches to computing such
reachsets [31, 32, 33, 34, 12, 13, 15, 35]. The toolbox Breach [31, 36] facili-
tates the use of sensitivity analysis to measure how neighboring trajectories
can evolve comparatively, thereby providing the knowledge to construct ap-
proximate reachsets. These approximations are not guaranteed to be sound
for nonlinear systems, but contraction metrics in [37] provide a means of sen-
sitivity analysis for nonlinear systems. A generalized approach that extends
contraction metrics for nonlinear systems [32] to compute reachsets serves
as a basis for some of the tools we will apply and discuss in Section 3.3.
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An on-the-fly algorithm to compute this metric for nonlinear systems is pre-
sented in [34] and implemented in the C2E2 software tool [12, 13]; whereas
a data-driven approach is implemented in the DryVR software tool [15]. In
building SDVTool, we use the approach called Parsimonious in [35], which
is a simulation-based method for reachability of linear systems but does not
rely on sensitivity analysis. Instead, the reachable sets of states are formu-
lated by applying the superposition principle—hence the restriction to linear
systems—to a finite number of simulation traces. These tools mentioned
will be used in our experiments in Chapter 5. There are also several works us-
ing simulations to reason about safety properties that do not rely on directly
computing reachsets [38, 39, 40].
3.1.2 Preliminaries
With some abuse of notation, we say a reachset R(ΘH, [t1, t2]) ⊂ val(V) con-
tains all the states that are reachable from ΘH at t = 0 over time interval
[t1, t2]. We will also refer to a reachtube R
T , a sequence of compact sets
{(Oi, ti)Ni=0}, such that R(ΘH, [ti−1, ti]) ⊆ Oi, t0 = 0, and tN = T . Notice
O ⊇ R is an overapproximation of the set of reachable states. We assume
ti − ti−1 = δ is uniform for all i. Intuitively, we can think of the reach-
tube RT as a reachset over T : R(ΘH, [0, T ]), or as a collection of reachsets:
∪i(R(ΘH, [ti−1, ti])). Denote a trajectory of the hybrid system as a function
ξ : val(V) × R≥0 → val(V), such that ξ(v0, t) is the state of the system at
time t starting from v0. Furthermore, a simulation trace of a trajectory is
denoted by ψ = {ξ(v0, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}.
3.1.3 Problem Approach
The safety verification problem is solved if:
1. we show that all reachable states are completely disjoint from the set
of unsafe states, i.e. RT ∩ U = ∅ (program returns Safe), or
2. we provide an unsafe counterexample trajectory ξ(v0, t) ∈ U , such that
v0 ∈ ΘH and t ≤ T (returns Unsafe).
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Since RT is an overapproximation of the true reachable set of states, it is
possible that a solution in this sense does not exist. In other words, a state
v ∈ RT may intersect with U but is not truly reachable so there exists no
trajectory such that ξ(v0, t) = v. Thus, in practice the safety verification
algorithm may terminate with an additional output Unknown.
The high-level verification algorithm is given in Algorithm 1, and a more
detailed version of it (that includes the implementation of line 1) can be
found in Figure 1 of [32]. If the computed reachtube cannot be shown to
be Safe, a finite number of trajectories are randomly generated (up to a
user-defined limit SimBnd). If one of these simulated trajectories provides a
counterexample to safety, an Unsafe result is given. Otherwise, it terminates
with Unknown. The next sections will discuss the approach to achieving
line 1 of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Safety verification of hybrid automatonH. A Safe result
guarantees no state in U is reachable by H over time horizon T with
initial set of states ΘH or Θ, if optionally specified.
Input: T,U ,H, (Θ)
Output: SafeFlag
1 RT ← computeReachtube(H, T, (Θ))
2 if RT ∩ U 6= ∅ then
3 for j = 1 :SimBnd do
4 ~x0 ← a randomly sampled point in ΘH (or Θ)
5 ψ ← Simulate(~x0, T,H)
6 if ψ ∩ U 6= ∅ then
7 return Unsafe
8 end
9 end
10 return Unknown
11 end
12 return Safe
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 is sound.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 2 in Section 3.2, where we are
given that RT (computed in line 1) contains all reachable states from some
state in ΘH within time T . If Algorithm 1 terminates Safe (line 12), then
RT ∩ U = ∅ must hold, as the if -block (lines 2-11) is skipped. Thus we
conclude that all reachable states are safe. Algorithm 1 only returns Unsafe
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(line 7) when a trajectory ψ from some initial state in ΘH up to time T
contains an unsafe state. Therefore, ψ itself is a proof of contradiction for
safety.
3.2 Computing Reachtubes
Recall that a hybrid automaton H = 〈V ,ΘH,A, D, T 〉 has state variables
V = X ∪ L, with X the set of continuous variables and L a discrete vari-
able. From here on out, we restrict the definitions given in Section 3.1 to
continuous variables X. In most domains and applications, we are only con-
cerned with studying the state variables ~x ∈ Rn = val(X), so the discrete
mode is decoupled from our safety properties and reachtube computations.
By choosing Θ,U ,R(Θ, [t1, t2]), RT ⊂ Rn and ξ(~x0, t) : Rn × R≥0 → Rn, we
are still able to express all the necessary parts of the problem. (Notice we
introduce initial set Θ ⊂ val(X) to distinguish from ΘH ⊂ val(V) as part of
the tuple for H.) The approaches to reachset computation presented in the
next sections rely on fixed dynamics, or knowledge of the full hybrid state
v ∈ val(V) since l ∈ val(L) gives the dynamics El. So while Θ is sufficient
for specifying the verification problem, the underlying algorithms still require
knowledge of the set ΘH, which is implicitly constructed by Θ as follows:
ΘH =
⋃
~x0∈Θ
{v = (~x0, li) : ~x0 ∈ Ili},
where Ili is the invariant set of states for mode li ∈ val(L).
The overarching algorithm for computing reachtubes in the tools C2E2,
DryVR, and SDVTool is given by Algorithm 2. Given a time horizon T and
an initial set of states Θ ⊂ Rn (where θi ⊆ Θ denotes the subset of states
in mode li), a reachset R(θi, T ) is computed using the flow equations of
mode li (or Eli). Then the convex hull of all states reachable by taking an
enabled transition dj from a subset Rj ⊆ R(θ, T ) is taken to be (θ′, l′). For
each possible transition, a new reachset R(θ′, T ) is computed under the new
mode l′. After all possible transitions within the time bound are accounted
for, the union of the reachsets in each mode forms the reachtube RT .
Notice this algorithm is necessarily conservative. Nondeterministic tran-
sitions result in more reachset subcomputations. Reachset subcomputations
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Algorithm 2: computeReachtube: Reachtube computation for a hybrid
automaton H.
Input: H, T,Θ
Output: RT
1 RT ← ∅
2 θ1, ..., θk ← Partition Θ such that ΘH =
⋃
i=1:k
(θi, li)
3 Q.push((θ1, l1), ..., (θk, lk))
4 while Q not empty do
5 (θ, l)← Q.pop()
6 R(θ, T )← computeReachset(θ, l, El, T )
7 R(θ, T )← R(θ, T ) ∩ invariant Il
8 for each transition dj ∈ D from mode l do
9 if dj is enabled by Rj ⊆ R(θ, T ) then
10 (θ′, l′)← state after taking transition dj from Rj
11 Q.push((θ′, l′))
12 end
13 end
14 RT ← RT ∪R(θ, T )
15 end
16 return RT
always cover the full time horizon length T , so this generally includes reach-
sets for t > T since transitions do not occur (if at all) until after some time
has elapsed. Thus the overapproximated regions of a reachtube can blow
up quickly for a number of reasons: large uncertainty in initial set, long
time horizon, nondeterministic transitions, number of transitions, and rep-
resentation of the reachset. This behavior increases the likelihood of overap-
proximated regions intersecting with the unsafe set of states in Algorithm 1,
barring a Safe or Unsafe result. This problem is alleviated in the software
tools by partitioning the initial sets into smaller subsets before computing
the reachtube. In the Pass benchmark models, we further reduce the effects
of nondeterminism by restricting the transition guard to the Passive mode
(see [t1, t2] in Figure 2.6) to a relatively small interval of time.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 2 returns guaranteed overapproxmations of reach-
able states of H from Θ within T time.
Proof sketch. The proof follows from Proposition 3 in Section 3.3, which
guarantees that all reachable states from an initial hybrid state (θ, l) that
can evolve according to the dynamics of mode l (i.e. the ODEs described
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by El) up to time T are contained in the overapproximated reachset R(θ, T )
computed in line 6.
First notice that the reachtube RT must include all initial states Θ. This
is satisfied because Θ =
⋃
i=1:k
θi from line 2, and each θi is checked in the main
loop, where R(θ, T ) ⊇ θ by Proposition 3 in line 6 and because θ∩ Il by line
2 in line 7. The inner for-loop (lines 8-13) does not change R(θ, T ), which
is completed contained in RT by line 14. Thus after k iterations of line 14
corresponding to checking each θi, we see that Θ ⊆ RT for any T ≥ 0.
Without loss of generality, assume k = 1. During the first execution of
the while-loop, we have θ = θ1 = Θ and line 6 computes a reachset R(θ, T )
that contains all reachable sets of states from θ under the dynamics of mode
l up to time T by Proposition 3. Line 7 preserves only the valid subset of
R(θ, T )—the continuous states that are possible when the discrete mode is
l, as defined by invariant Il. It is clear that all reachable states from θ with
mode l is still contained in R(θ, T ) after line 7. Again, the for-loop does not
affect this reachset, and the reachset R(θ, T ) is completely contained in RT
by line 14.
If no transitions can be taken from R(θ, T ), the algorithm does not enter
the for-loop (lines 8-13) so nothing is pushed to Q, which is now empty
after line 5. The while-loop terminates and the returned reachtube RT
overapproximates the reachable states of the system H up to time T .
If a transition to mode lj can be taken from R(θ, T ), we take Rj to be
the subset of R(θ, T ) that intersects with the transition guard. Then for
every v ∈ Rj and v′ is the state after taking transition dj, v′ ∈ (θ′, lj).
Thus for l′ = lj, we obtain an overapproximation of reachable states imme-
diately after transition dj in (θ
′, l′) in line 10. When the for-loop terminates
and all possible transitions have been checked, Q contains a set of {(θ′i, l′i)},
whose union forms a new “initial” set of states corresponding to an overap-
proximation of all reachable states after one transition has been taken. In
fact, checking all the sets currently in Q is equivalent to recursively calling
computeReachtube(H, T, Θ˜), with Θ˜ = ⋃
i
θ′i. The remaining executions of
Algorithm 2 can be re-casted as a series of recursive function calls, and the
last recursive call corresponds to an initial set from which no transitions can
be taken, in which case we have already previously concluded the returned
value of RT is an overapproximation of all reachable states from the input
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argument Θ for time T . We can invoke an inductive argument to show that
the initial call to computeReachtube, Algorithm 2 itself, satisfies Proposition
2.
The upcoming sections discuss the underlying algorithms for computing
reachsets (line 4 in Algorithm 2). This is the component that the various tools
we consider implement differently. Notice this subroutine computeReachset
takes the dynamics of a single mode l as an input argument. In fact, the over-
approximated reachset it returns assumes the system can evolve according to
only one set of ODEs El, so the hybrid nature of the system is not accounted
for at this step. Hence, the primary purpose of Algorithm 2 is to collect all
reachable states considering all possible sets of continuous dynamics.
3.3 Computing Reachsets with Discrepancy Functions
In this section, we present the simulation-based reachability computation
algorithm that is implemented in two of the tools we test: C2E2 [12, 13] and
DryVR [15]. The discussion in the preceding sections have directly involved
hybrid automaton models, but for the remainder of this chapter, we will only
work with a fixed set of ODEs given by El and no notion of a discrete mode.
A continuous function β : Rn×Rn×R≥0 → R≥0 is a discrepancy function
if, for any pair of states ~x1, ~x2 ∈ Rn and any time t ≥ 0, the following holds:
||ξ(~x1, t)− ξ(~x2, t)|| ≤ β(~x1, ~x2, t), (3.1)
lim
~x1→~x2
β(~x1, ~x2, t) = 0. (3.2)
Given a valid discrepancy function, we can compute R(θ, T ) by choosing
a ~x0 ∈ θ to generate a simulation trace ψ over time horizon T . Then the
simulation trace ψ is expanded by β (by way of the Minkowski sum), so that
the result is an overapproximation of the reachset from Θ. This is given in
Algorithm 3.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 3 is sound and relatively complete.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Theorem 11 of [32].
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Algorithm 3: computeReachset : Compute the overapproximation of
reachable states from initial set θ that evolves according to El using a
discrepancy function
Input: θ, T, El, β
Output: R(θ, T )
1 ~x0 ← some point in θ
2 ψ ← Simulate(~x0, T, El)
3 R(θ, T )← ψ ⊕ β
4 return R(θ, T )
Candidate discrepancy functions can be obtained using a global Lipschitz
constant or using a matrix norm for linear systems. However, typically these
approaches give discrepancy functions that blow up exponentially with time
and therefore are not useful for verifying problems with long time horizons.
Approaches for computing tighter discrepancy functions are implemented in
C2E2 and DryVR.
In C2E2, the discrepancy function is computed using an automatic on-the-
fly approach that relies on bounds of the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics
of the continuous components of the hybrid system [13]. In DryVR, the
discrepancy function is computed using PAC learning of linear separators [41]
on simulations of a black-box model of the continuous dynamics [15] .
The algorithm in C2E2 relies on white-box models, where the continuous
dynamics are captured by ODEs. In other words, given a vector of contin-
uous state variables ~x ∈ Rn, its dynamics can be described by ~˙x = f(~x(t)),
where f is Lipschitz and possibly nonlinear. In particular, the discrepancy
function computation in C2E2 evaluates the condition number of J(~x), the
Jacobian matrix of f evaluated at ~x. In the case of ill-conditioned matrices,
such as what we have in the Passive mode (the A-matrix representation of
(2.2)), the overapproximation error blows up. Ill-conditioned systems may
arise from extremely large and small coefficients appearing together in J(~x0),
which may be alleviated to an extent by scaling the state variables. In this
case, linearization of the system resulted in a singular matrix, so scaling is
ineffective. In order to address this problem, we implement an alternative
model-based reachset computation method called Parsimonious in SDVTool,
which is presented next.
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3.4 Computing Reachsets using Parsimonious
The simulation-based reachability computation algorithm implemented in
SDVTool is named Parsimonious and presented in [42]. Like C2E2, this
algorithm requires a white-box model of the continuous system dynamics.
Moreover, it is restricted to linear ODEs. Then for a continuous state vector
~x ∈ Rn, the flow equations are described by: ~˙x(t) = A˜(t)~x(t).
For an n-dimensional system, n+1 simulations are performed. From these
simulations, special sets called generalized star sets, are generated to rep-
resent the exact reachsets. Generalized star sets can efficiently represent a
variety of data structures, such as convex polyhedra. Part of the motivation
for implementing Parsimonious is to improve the performance and robust-
ness of C2E2, so we choose to restrict our implementation in SDVTool to
hyperrectangles for reachset representation, same as C2E2. Thus, we will
only introduce the notion of a generalized star set for hyperrectangles.
Let the generalized star set be represented by a pair 〈~x0, V 〉, where ~x0 ∈ Rn
is the state at the center of the hyperrectangle and V = {v1, ..., vn} ⊆ Rn is
a standard basis with the vectors scaled to the radius of each dimension of
the hyperrectangle. Then the set defined by 〈~x0, V 〉 is
{~x ∈ Rn | ∃α1, . . . , αn ∈ [−1, 1], ~x = ~x0 +
n∑
i=1
αivi}.
The reachability algorithm will take this representation of the initial set
of states of the system and transform the center state and basis, such that
a subsequent reachset at time ti is represented by the generalized star set
R∗i = 〈~x(ti), Vi〉, with Vi = {vi1, ..., vin}.. These sets are zonotopes but not
necessarily hyperrectangles, so they are further over-approximated with hy-
perrectangles in SDVTool as follows:
Ri = {~x : ~x ≤ ~x(ti) +
n∑
j=1
max(−vij, vij)
and ~x ≥ ~x(ti) +
n∑
j=1
min(−vij, vij)}.
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Algorithm 4: computeReachset : Compute the overapproximation of
reachable states from initial set θ that evolves according to El using
Parsimonious with hyperrectangles
Input: θ = 〈~x0, V 〉, T, El
Output: R(θ, T )
1 ψ ← Simulate(~x0, T, El)
2 for each vi ∈ V do
3 ψi ← Simulate(~x0 + vi, T, El)
4 v˜i ← ψi − ψ // Note vi ∈ Rn but v˜i ∈ Rn×k, where there are
k-simulation points over T.
5 end
6 V˜ ← {v˜1, ..., v˜n}
7 R(θ, T )← ⋃
j=1:k
{~x : ~x ≤ ψj +∑ni=1 max(−v˜ji , v˜ji ) and ~x ≥
ψj +
∑n
i=1 min(−v˜ji , v˜ji )} // ψj = ξ(~x0, tj) ∈ ψ and v˜ji is the j-th
column of v˜i
8 return R(θ, T )
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CHAPTER 4
SDVTOOL
In this chapter, we will present the details of the implementation of SDVTool.
The verification algorithm that SDVTool implements is given in Chapter 3
and the component that distinguishes this tool from existing tools is discussed
in Section 3.4.
4.1 Architecture and Overview
SDVTool is implemented in Matlab and requires an additional installation of
the MPT3 toolbox [43]. The user interacts with the tool by providing an
input file that is structured as described in Section 4.2. The implementation
of the verification algorithm presented in Chapter 3 is broken up into three
main components. The first (grey box in Figure 4.1) corresponds to the high-
level procedure given by Algorithm 1. The second (white box in Figure 4.1)
is the compute reachtube method in Algorithm 2. Finally the subroutine
compute reachset is called within that, which is given in Algorithm 4. Notice
in Algorithm 1 that safety is determined by checking the intersection of
reachtube RT with unsafe set U , but in Figure 4.1 safety is checked within
the reachtube computation loop. From Algorithm 2 line 14, it is clear that
RT is constructed from the union of all reachset subcomputations R(θ, T ),
so checking the intersection of each R(θ, T ) with U is equivalent to checking
RT ∩ U .
Dependence on the MPT3 toolbox is introduced in the current version of
SDVTool and is motivated by the recent development of another verification
tool called CODEV 1, which was introduced to handle a class of hybrid
models that use model predictive control (MPC). The original version of
1https://bitbucket.org/nchan2/codev
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Model input script
SDVTool
Compute Reachtube
Partition
initial set
Compute
Reachset
Check
safety
Simulate
randomly
Safety result
and reachtube
Safe
Otherwise
UnknownUnsafe
Safe
Figure 4.1: Overview of SDVTool’s structure.
SDVTool can be obtained from this link 2, but we present the more robust,
current version of SDVTool 3 in this thesis.
The Polyhedron-data type provided by MPT3 toolbox is used to repre-
sent the hyperrectangular reachsets computed. In particular, the output of
the program is a flag indicating Safe (safeFlag=1), Unsafe (safeFlag=0),
or otherwise Unknown (safeFlag=-1), and a corresponding Reachtube
reach—a temporally sorted array of Polyhedron-objects—that is empty
if a safe result cannot be obtained. The output reach can be plotted in
Matlab as usual: plot(reach), if the model is 2-dimensional. Otherwise,
the projection method may be used to plot in dimensions i, j as follows:
plot(reach.projection([i,j])).
4.2 Input Specification
In order to fully specify the safety verification problem, we need the hy-
brid model definition and additional parameters for the safety verification
problem. The input file is set up to return a struct with a function handle
flowEq to the plant dynamics (i.e. the dynamics that do not change across
discrete modes); a struct MPCsol (naming inherited from CODEV) that con-
tains the invariant regions and corresponding control laws (i.e. components
2https://tinyurl.com/verifysat
3https://bitbucket.org/nchan2/sdvtool2
29
of the dynamics that change across discrete modes); a set of Polyhedron
objects unsafeStates describing the sets of unsafe states; a Polyhedron
object initStates describing the initial set of states for the verification; and
a struct vPar containing remaining parameters needed for verification (i.e.
time horizon and simulation step size).
We illustrate the input structure usage with the example for Lin-SwLQ
benchmark model. Let us refer to the output of the input file struct as
inPar. The dynamics given by Equations 2.2 are specified in inPar.flowEq,
with an input argument accounting for Fx, Fy. This argument is the ma-
trix inPar.MPCsol.Fi{i}—Ki from Equation 2.5—which corresponds to the
mode given by invariant region defined by Polyhedron inPar.MPCsol.Pn{i}.
Each unsafe set given in Section 2.3 (or its complement) is given as a Poly-
hedron member of the array inPar.unsafeStates.region, with a corre-
sponding flag in inPar.unsafeStates.safe that is set to 0 when the region
is an unsafe set, a subset of U , and to 1 when the region is a safe set. The
remaining components define the verification problem: inPar.initStates
is a Polyhedron representing Θ, inPar.vPar.Thorizon is an array [0, T ],
and inPar.vPar.simStep is a fixed simulation step size corresponding with
δ from Section 3.1.
4.3 Main Verification Routine
The main program is verify.m. After parsing the input file, the poly2ball
routine takes the initial set inPar.initStates and set of mode invariants
inPar.MPCsol.Pn and returns subsets of the initial set which correspond to
θi in line 2 of Algorithm 2. We instantiate a Tree object (CTree) within the
verify.m main loop, so as to track the various reachtubes that are generated
for each θi. This implementation using a tree is inherited from CODEV,
where each θi might be further partitioned later in the program execution,
but is admittedly unnecessary for SDVTool where the partitioning only occurs
once. The remainder of this routine follows Algorithm 1 very closely.
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4.4 Compute Reachtube Routine
The block for computing reachtubes is implemented in computeReach.m.
This routine implements Algorithm 2. Again, a tree data structure is used to
track the recursive reachset computations necessary for constructing the full
reachtube RT . Due to partitioning in the main loop, the input set of initial
states to the computeReach method in the main loop is always constrained to
a single discrete mode. So upon the first execution of line 7 in Algorithm 2,
this reachset R1 := R(θ, T ) is considered the root of a Tree labeled RTree.
For each enabled transition, a new reachset is computed (say R2, R3, ...) by
way of adding the subset of initial states resulting from taking the transition
to the queue of sets Q (line 11) that will be passed to computeReachset (line
6) upon some future iteration of the while-loop. These reachsets R2, R3, ...
are the children nodes of root R1. Clearly these reachsets may generate their
own children.
Thus the Tree data structure allows us to keep track of which reachsets
spawned which other reachsets. The pseudocode given in Algorithm 2 uses
a queue in line 4 because the ordering of the reachset computations does not
matter. From the perspective of the underlying Tree, the problem of when to
call computeReachset is equivalent to tree exploration. A depth-first search
(DFS) is currently implemented in computeReach.
We could preserve the most informative model by storing a Polyhedron
representation for each reachset or node of the tree, but this is not space-
efficient so we further overapproximate reachsets by representing the union
of sibling sets with one data structure. Storing an actual union of Polyhe-
dron-objects results in a cell array of Polyhedron, which does not reduce
space; so, the convex hull of sibling sets is taken instead and stored in a
single Polyhedron object—freeing the space the sibling nodes has previ-
ously occupied. This is implemented by the reachUnion member function
of the custom treeNode class. Once all the reachset subcomputations are
completed, the reachtube RT will look like there is only a single (overapprox-
imated, convex) reachset at each level of the tree. The reachtube RT looks
like an array of Polyhedron objects, each corresponding to one of these
nodes of the tree.
The computeReachset method given in Algorithm 4 is implemented in
computePost.m. The only difference is an additional call to checkSafety.m.
31
If this result is unsafe, it is passed all the way back to the main loop (set-
ting line 2 of Algorithm 1), ending the reachset/reachtube computations and
initiating the random search for a counterexample simulation trace.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In Section 5.1, we will discuss the precise parameters used for the rendezvous
mission benchmark models and for the proposed controllers. Then we demon-
strate a variety of software verification tools on a subset of the possible
benchmark model configurations in Section 5.2.
5.1 Setup
5.1.1 Mission Parameters
Our benchmark rendezvous mission is preceded and succeeded by other mis-
sion phases of the ARPOD formulation in [2]. Our choice of initial set of
states and time horizon keeps in line with the full ARPOD scenario. We
choose a time horizon of T = 4 hr and initial set:
Θ = {~x ∈ R4 | ∃α1, . . . , α4 ∈ [−1, 1], ~x = ~x0 + [α1, α2, α3, α4] ∗ ~r,
~x0 = [−900m,−400m, 0m/s, 0m/s]T , ~r = [25m, 25m, 0m/s, 0m/s]T}.
This gives an initial separation distance that is approximately 1000 m (the
transition guard defined in [2] from the preceding mission stage,) and a rea-
sonable relative angle tan−1( y
x
) because the initial position given for the full
ARPOD mission starts at a position along the −jˆ-direction. The transitions
between mission phases do not rely on the relative velocity of the chaser,
so we choose to start the rendezvous phases from a zero relative velocity.
The radius of the hyperrectangle Θ can be interpreted as having bounded
uncertainty in the chaser’s initial position but the chaser’s initial velocity is
precisely fixed. We use experimental data from [2] to set a reasonable time
bound for the rendezvous portion of the total ARPOD mission.
For the Pass mission model configuration, we choose a small interval at
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[120, 125 min] for the transition guard [t1, t2] in Figure 2.6. We experimen-
tally observe this is an interval that ensures the chaser satellite will transition
to Mode 2 before transitioning to Passive in that particular model (Lin-SwLQ-
Pass).
5.1.2 Unsafe Sets
In Section 2.3, we described the mission constraints and the need to ap-
proximate these with affine inequalities. Table 5.1 gives these precise affine
approximations. Furthermore, they are separated so that the union of each
of these sets describes the unsafe sets of states. Each of these properties are
checked independently of one another in the software tools because most of
the tools only check one convex polytope at a time.
Table 5.1: Description of each unsafe property that results from the mission
constraints presented in Section 2.3.
Property Description Prop. Description
Thrust1 Fx < −10 VEL1 −x˙ < −3
Thrust2 −Fx < −10 VEL2 x˙ < −3
Thrust3 Fy < −10 VEL3 −y˙ < −3
Thrust4 −Fy < −10 VEL4 y˙ < −3
LOS1 x < −100 VEL5 −x˙− y˙ < −3√2
LOS2 x tan (30◦)− y < 0 VEL6 −x˙+ y˙ < −3√2
LOS3 x tan (30◦) + y < 0 VEL7 x˙− y˙ < −3√2
PASS (x + y < 1) ∩ (x− y < 1) ∩
(−x−y < 1)∩ (−x+y < 1)
VEL8 x˙+ y˙ < −3√2
5.1.3 Controller Parameters
In Section 2.4, we presented the framework for constructing the SwLQ con-
troller. Here, we give the particular values of the cost functions from Equa-
tion 2.3 we used in our experiments, with units for x, y in [m], x˙, y˙ in [m/min],
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and Fx, Fy in [kg·m/min2]:
Q1 =

1
10002
0 0 0
0 1
8662
0 0
0 0 1
202
0
0 0 0 1
202

Q2 =

1
1002
0 0 0
0 1
1002
0 0
0 0 1
32
0
0 0 0 1
32

R1 = R2 =
[
1
288002
0
0 1
288002
]
.
Using Matlab’s lqr function, the following control law gains are obtained:
K1 =
[
28.83 −0.10 1449.98 −0.005
0.08 33.26 −0.005 1451.50
]
K2 =
[
288.03 −0.13 9614.99 0
0.13 288.0 0 9615.0
]
.
In Section 2.5, we presented the construction of the novel SDLQ controller.
Equation 2.7 gave the parameterized cost function weights in Q. For the
remaining cost function weight R, we choose a constant matrix as follows:
R =
[
1
360002
0
0 1
360002
]
.
Recall a new LQR control law is computed every δ-time (see transition
in Figure 2.7). We choose δ = 0.5 min. This LQR computation is also
completed using Matlab’s lqr function.
5.1.4 Explicit Variables
By our choice of full-state feedback controllers, Fx, Fy (or ~u) become linear
functions of ~x, so there are no explicit variables modeling Fx, Fy in the pro-
posed hybrid benchmark models as observed in Figures 2.4-2.7. In other
words, the following systems describe equivalent behaviors:
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1. ~˙x = A~x+B~u, ~u = −K~x,
2. ~˙x = (A−BK)~x,
and we have focused on that given in system 2, since we are working with
flow equations or trajectories that are described by ODEs.
Our verification problem involves constraints on ~u. In order to check these
properties in the software tools, the constraints would take the form of affine
inequalities −K~x < c. However, the syntax of C2E2 is limited to 1- or
2-dimensional affine inequalities. Thus we revise the dynamical system de-
scribed by system 1 to be:
~˙x = A~x+B~u,
~˙u = −K~˙x = −KA~x−KB~u.
This is equivalent to the original system 1 given the appropriate ini-
tial conditions. This gives an augmented 6-dimensional state vector ~˜x =
[x, y, x˙, y˙, Fx, Fy]. This augmented system is required to verify thrust con-
straints in C2E2. While it is not required in SpaceEx, the 6-dimensional
model may still be used in SpaceEx to obtain reach sets for the Fx, Fy vari-
ables.
5.2 Experiments
In this thesis, we only explore the application of a subset of verification
tools to a subset of the proposed benchmark satellite rendezvous models. In
particular, Table 5.2 describes the possible model configurations and which
tools we have applied to each.
5.2.1 Experiments for the SwLQ Controller
We use the Lin-SwLQ model to compare tool performance between SDVTool,
C2E2, and SpaceEx. First, all the tools returned a Safe result for all the prop-
erties in Table 5.1 except for PASS (corresponding with collision avoidance
during the Passive mode), under the parameters given in Sections 5.1.1 and
5.1.3. Note that C2E2 and SpaceEx re-execute their verification algorithms
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Table 5.2: Summary of the experimental setups (model configurations and
software tools) tested in this thesis.
Tool SwLQ SwLQ-Pass SDLQ SDLQ-Pass
SDVTool (Lin) X X
SpaceEx (Lin) X X
C2E2 (Lin) X
C2E2 (NLin) X
DryVR (Lin) X
DryVR (NLin)
for each property, whereas SDVTool checks all properties in one execution of
the program. Table 5.3 summarizes the runtimes taken to obtain these re-
sults. The runtime listed for a property, say LOS, is taken to be the average
runtime to check each sub-property, e.g. LOS1, LOS2, and LOS3. The reach-
tubes returned by each tool are plotted for the relative position variables x, y
in Figure 5.1.
Table 5.3: Time (seconds) taken to check each safety property across
different tools. “N/V” indicates that the property was not successfully
checked.
Tool Thrust LOS VEL PASS All
SDVTool 5.5
SpaceEx 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.5
C2E2 85 20 17.8 N/V
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.1: Reachable positions for rendezvous using SwLQ without any
transition to Passive as computed by: (a) SDVTool (Lin), (b) SpaceEx (Lin),
and (c) C2E2 (NLin).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5.2: Reachsets computed by SDVTool under the Lin-SwLQPass
model for: (a) velocity in Mode 2, (b) thrust, and (c) positions reached
after a transition to Passive during [120,125 min].
The Lin-SwLQ-Pass model is verified to be Safe by both SDVTool and
SpaceEx. The reachtubes look similar so we only include the plots from
SDVTool to show what the reachable states look like in other dimensions in
Figure 5.2.
In C2E2, checking Pass terminates in an Unknown result (due to the state-
space explosion problem mentioned in Section 3.3). However, we successfully
show for both Lin and NLin models without Pass that the remaining safety
properties are achieved. The reachtube for relative position using the NLin
model is given in Figure 5.1c to further demonstrate that the linear model
provides a good approximation of the nonlinear dynamics in this benchmark.
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Lastly we present an experiment that focuses on evaluating the limitations
of the controller with respective to passive safety. We use SDVTool to run
successive tests on the Lin-SwLQ-Pass model for all the safety properties,
changing only the initial set of states and the transition guard to Passive.
Due to the parameters given by the encompassing ARPOD mission in [2], we
expect our rendezvous mission to start at Mode 1 with a separation distance
around 1000 m and at an angle in the third quadrant of the relative coordinate
frame. We maintain the same assumptions as before that the initial velocities
are zero.
This resulting set of initial states Θ (see the colored arc in Figure 5.3) is
partitioned into smaller sets θ1, θ2, ..., such that ∪iθi = Θ. For each initial
set θi, we run the verification program N times. On the j
th run, the Passive
transition guard is set to [t1, t2] = [tj−1, tj] and t0 = 0, tN = 270 min. In
particular we choose 5 min increments so N = 54. The results give us an
idea of how long (within 5 minutes) a rendezvous mission from an initial
state (within the neighborhood of its respective θj) can still safely initiate
a passive abort. Should a failure occur beyond this elapsed time, an active
abort would be necessary (or a different control strategy other than the SwLQ
presented here).
Figure 5.3 depicts the results of this experiment by assigning a color to the
largest value of tj for which the algorithm returns a safe result. For example,
if we look at the initial state [−900,−400, 0, 0] or a small neighborhood of
this point, the color is a deep red indicating that if we perform rendezvous
starting from this initial state, we can successfully rendezvous and abort
the mission at any time before the 270 min bound tested. If we look at a
neighborhood around [−200,−900, 0, 0], the color is a light blue indicating
that we can only guarantee that the rendezvous can safely abort at any time
before 100 min. If a transition to Passive occurs after 100 min, this may
result in a violation of the passive safety property or a rendezvous property
(e.g. max thrust) may be violated after 100 min.
5.2.2 Experiments for the SDLQ Controller
For the SDLQ controller, we do not have an explicit closed-form model de-
scription though we are able to represent it compactly in Figure 2.7. The
39
Figure 5.3: Initial positions (with zero initial velocities) of Lin-SwLQ-Pass
that have been verified by SDVTool to be safe. They are safe for Passive
transition times up to the time shown by the color map.
update function here “rewrites” the model description (the flow equations)
periodically. The tools we have discussed thus far (SDVTool, C2E2, and
SpaceEx) cannot handle models of this nature. However, we presented DryVR
in Section 3.3 and noted that it did not rely on such white-box models, but
could handle black-box models given a simulation artifact—we have imple-
mented the simulation of the hybrid system in Figure 2.7 in Matlab.
Running the simulation artifact for the Lin-SDLQ model through DryVR
provided Safe results (with reachtubes shown in Figure 5.4) for the thrust
and LOS properties, and an Unsafe result for the total velocity (i.e. provided
a counterexample simulation trace shown in Figure 5.5). This unsafe result is
not surprising as the parameterized cost function proposed in Equation (2.7)
was designed to enforce the LOS constraint and not necessarily the velocity
constraint (notice dependence on x, y but not on x˙, y˙).
The reachtubes obtained from checking thrust and LOS properties are
plotted along the relative position dimensions and for thrust in each direc-
tion in Figure 5.4. The runtimes for these tests were on the order of hours.
While this is not immediately practical, it establishes the feasibility of the
approach and motivates more careful engineering and parallelization. The
primary source of this long overhead is due to the frequent re-computation of
the SDLQ control law. This slows down a single simulation run and DryVR
requires the generation of multiple simulation traces. In DryVR, the ran-
dom simulation search for counterexamples (lines 3-9 in Algorithm 1) occurs
concurrently within the reachtube computation (line 1), so running the ver-
40
ification program for the total velocity (VEL) constraints completed on the
order of seconds.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: (a) Reachable positions (blue) and unsafe positions (red). (b)
Reachable thrusts: Fx (blue) and Fy (green).
Figure 5.5: Simulated trajectory of total velocity starting from a state in Θ
that violates the velocity constraint (red).
We additionally check the correctness of the discrepancy function learned
in DryVR, that is, whether the learned function meets the property of dis-
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crepancy functions stated in Equations (3.2). For this experiment, we ran-
domly sample the initial states in Θ, generate their simulation traces, and
check whether any pair of these traces provide a counterexample to Equa-
tions (3.2). We do this for 600 samples and find no such counterexamples;
thus, we conclude that the discrepancy function computed by DryVR in this
example holds with high confidence.
Lastly, we perform an experiment to evaluate the performance of the SDLQ
controller (rather than its capability to achieve safety) by running simulations
using SDLQ, SwLQ, and a model predictive controller (MPC) that was used
in the original benchmark formulation paper [2]. Specifically, we use the
realistic performance metric of fuel consumption to compare performance
between controllers. In this case, fuel consumption is taken to be:
J(T ) =
∫ T
0
||~u(t)||dt.
These simulations are performed under the same initial conditions and a
terminating condition of achieving ρ = 20 m (which occurs at different times
tf and terminal states ~xtf for each controller). The results are given in
Table 5.4, and a plot of the cumulative fuel expended is in Figure 5.6. MPC
minimizes the closing velocity best without sacrificing too much in completion
time and fuel consumption. The SwLQ achieves the best completion time
but at a high cost in fuel consumption. Finally, SDLQ achieves the best fuel
costs with acceptable increase in completion time but unacceptable ranges
of velocity that violate constraints.
Table 5.4: Comparison of terminal states, completion times, and total fuel
cost.
~xtf tf J(tf )
SDLQ [-19.99, -0.23, 3.52, 0.09] 223.7min 168.6N
SwLQ [-19.09, -5.97, 0.57, 0.18] 166.4min 531.8N
MPC [-19.91, -0.01, 0.003, 0.0] 180.0min 213.0N
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Figure 5.6: Cumulative fuel consumption for three different controllers
obtained through simulation under same initial state and termination
condition.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we present a set of linear (Lin) and nonlinear (NLin), possibly
nondeterministic (if Pass) benchmark models of an autonomous rendezvous
maneuver for spacecraft with several safety requirements. We designed a
switched LQR (SwLQ) controller and verified its safety across a subset of the
provided models, a variety of initial conditions and parameter ranges, and us-
ing three different software tools (SDVTool, C2E2, and SpaceEx) for bounded
model-checking of hybrid systems. This particular subset of experiments in-
volving the passive abort maneuver (Pass) has shed light on the weakness
of simulation-driven verification in handling ill-conditioned models, and mo-
tivated the development of SDVTool—a tool intended to test an alternative
reachability computation algorithm that could improve the original tool in
question: C2E2.
We also proposed a novel controller, the state-dependent LQ (SDLQ) con-
trol, which is a piecewise continuous state-feedback controller obtained by
periodically recomputing a quadratic optimization problem that implicitly
enforces system constraints. The design framework involves choosing an
appropriate state-based function for the quadratic objective function, and
then verifying that the resulting closed-loop system does not violate safety
constraints. However this model proved to be intractable under these previ-
ously mentioned software verification tools. This provided the opportunity
to demonstrate and highlight the advantages of a more recently developed
data-driven reachability analysis tool, DryVR.
The results provide a foundation for verifying more sophisticated maneu-
vers (including the extended ARPOD mission) in future autonomous space
operations. However, there are still many threads to address before obtain-
ing a fully mature, safe controller for such applications. For example, we
proposed a state feedback controller, but we ought to consider a situation
where full state measurement is not possible, such as is the case for angles-
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only rendezvous from the full ARPOD problem. Here, a simple bang-bang
controller could be used but would result in unstable behavior similar to
what was observed in the Passive mode in C2E2 (the resulting closed-loop
system gives the same Jacobians which are used to compute discrepancy in
this tool). The autonomous rendezvous problem can easily be made more
challenging and realistic, which then prompts innovation and application of
problems in observability, optimal and robust control, and the like. There is
a concurrent need to address algorithmic verifiability of these sophisticated,
innovative control solutions. C2E2 is one example of the ongoing effort to
cover a large, growing class of nonlinear models, but we have already ob-
served a facet of its limitations with the SDLQ models. It is clear that
DryVR shows much promise in significantly extending the classes of models
that can be automatically verified. It remains to be seen how we can ap-
ply rigorous safety-checking to optimal, constrained control schemes, such
as model predictive control (e.g. if optimization constraints are relaxed).
This safety-checking is especially important in the context of autonomous
spacecraft navigation, as it poses a difficult control problem and its proposed
solutions can become increasingly complex and creative.
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